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CALENDARING
Appellee,

Video

Publishing

Ventures,

Inc.,

(hereinafter

"VPV")/ claims that oral argument and a published opinion is not
necessary because the trial court's rulings were fact sensitive and
should therefore be summarily affirmed.
apply the appropriate criteria.

VPV, however, does not

The appropriate criteria is

whether this court's ruling would contribute to Utah's body of
caselaw by making new law.
Whether

this court accepts oral argument and

issues an

published opinion depends on whether this court upholds or reverses
the trial court's ruling.

Since the trial court departed from

established case law at several points in its rulings, in order for
this court to uphold the trial court's rulings, this court would
need to either depart from or modify existing caselaw.

Such a

departure or modification would result in new caselaw which would
need to be published.
If, on the other hand, this court merely applies existing case
law to the basic facts as found by the trial court, it will
necessarily reverse the trial court, but may do so without oral
argument in an unpublished opinion.
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE
VPV

claims

that Appellant's, Stan Hartmark

(hereinafter

"Hartmark"), entire appeal involves challenges to the trial court's
factual findings, and should be dismissed for failure to marshal
the evidence.
not

VPV's request is without merit because Hartmark is

challenging

basic

factual

findings
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which

would

require

marshaling.

The challenges raised by Hartmark involve the trial

court's disregard of applicable law or misapplication of the law in
reaching its ultimate findings or conclusions.

Such issues are

legal in nature.
VPV has made the common mistake of confusing the trial court's
ultimate conclusions arrived at by applying the law to the basic
facts and the trial court's basic findings of fact regarding what
actually happened.

The marshaling requirement only applies when

challenging basic facts.

Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah

App. 1991).
Hartmark is not seeking to overturn the trial court's basic
factual findings regarding what happened.

Hartmark is seeking

review of the trial court's legal conclusions and application of
the law to those facts in reaching its ultimate conclusions. Since
Hartmark is challenging the trial court's legal conclusions and
applications of the law to the facts, not the trial court's
findings of basic fact, marshaling is not required, nor would it
even prove helpful.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
VPV makes the same mistake involving the appropriate standard
of review. VPV erroneously assumes that the trial court's ultimate
conclusions, such as its "finding" that there was a lack of a
meeting of the minds or a lack of adequate consideration, are basic
factual findings to be reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard.
Such

"findings"

are

not

factual.
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Rather,

they

are

legal

conclusions in that they are the ultimate conclusion reached by
applying the law to the basic underlying facts.
If the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the law, there
is no reason to give it the same deference that is given when the
trial court makes factual determinations based on the credibility
of the witnesses.

The ultimate legal CDnclusions are based on

analysis, not courtroom observations.
court

is

free

to

correct

the

Consequently, the appellate

trial

court's

ultimate

legal

conclusions if the trial court has ignored, misinterpreted, or
misapplied the caselaw in reaching such conclusions.
Construction v. Palmer. 886 P.2d 92 (Utah

Interwest

App. 1994).

Since each issue raised by Hartmark involves an erroneous
legal

ruling

or misapplication

of

the

law

to the

facts, the

appropriate standard of review is a correction of error.
VPV's

claim

that

the

trial

court's

ultimate

rulings

are

factual findings deserving deference is a smokescreen to cover the
trial court's analytical errors.

As each challenge raised by

Hartmark is revisited below, the legal mistake or analytical error
made by the trial court will be clearly identified so as to confirm
that this court is being called upon to correct the trial court's
analytical and legal errors, not its basic factual findings.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE GENERAL RELEASE
UNENFORCEABLE, WAS AN IMPROPER LEGAL CONCLUSION AND
SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS.

WAS
NOT

The first issue raised by Hartmark is that the trial court
erroneously concluded that the general release was unenforceable
- 3 -

because there was no meeting of the minds.
there

was

no

"meeting

of

the minds"

is

The conclusion that
an

ultimate

legal

conclusion. The trial court's analysis in reaching that conclusion
in this case is patently flawed.1
This court recently held in Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance
Insurance v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Case No. 940594-CA
(Utah App. 1995) , that a sua sponte ruling from the bench is
inappropriate.

This court specifically stated:

Raising an issue not addressed by the parties
is inappropriate and outside of the discretion
given the governing tribunal because it
encroaches upon the advocate responsibility
conferred upon counsel . . . Furthermore, if a
party fails to raise an issue and present
evidence regarding the same, it has waived the
right to do so . . . Thus, '[t]he interest of
justice are not enhanced when the court
exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out
and deciding an issue that would otherwise be
dead, it not having been litigated at the time
of trial.' Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247
(Utah 1983)).
Hilton, at 6.
This court ruled, within the past two (2) weeks, that it was
improper for a trial court to raise and decide an issue sua sponte
when it was never expressed or implied by the party as part of the
l

. VPV takes exception to Hartmark's assertion that the trial
court raised the meeting of the minds issue sua sponte by citing
this court to nineteen pages of transcript. A review of those
nineteen pages will show that VPV never raised a "meeting of the
minds" challenge. The issue was never addressed until the trial
court raised it itself in its ruling. The fact that the trial
court dismissed Hartmark's argument sua sponte was inappropriate
does not invalidate Hartmark's argument. There is no disputing
that the trial court impermissibly raised the meeting of the minds
argument on its own initiative.
- 4-

party's theory of their case. Hilton, at 7. Since this issue was
very recently decided by this Court, further discussion on the
point would certainly be redundant.
The trial court ruled that there was not a meeting of the
minds because the parties took two positions at trial which the
court

deemed

were

"different".

The

court

considered

the

"different" positions to be proof that there was not a meeting of
the minds at the time the release was signed.

In reality, the

trial court was comparing apples and oranges.

It was comparing

VPV's factual claim with Hartmark's legal argument.
VPV had claimed, and the trial court so found, that VPV signed
the release in order to get the company checkbook from Hartmark.2
The trial court also found that obtaining the financial records was
the "main motivation" for VPV signing the release. The trial court
then addressed Hartmark's legal argument that, regardless of VPV's
motivation, the release was binding because the mutual releases, in
and of themselves, constituted adequate consideration.
The trial court then concluded:

"With those two positions it

seemed very apparent that there was not a meeting of the minds as

2

. Whether or not Hartmark demanded the release in exchange
for the checkbook was in dispute at trial. No testimony was ever
given that Hartmark in fact demanded the release.
The only
testimony given was hearsay that the attorney, Ron Vance, had told
VPV officers that Hartmark wanted a release before he would
surrender the financial records.
Despite the sparsity of the evidence, the trial court found
that Hartmark had refused to surrender the records until he
received a general release. This underlying factual finding is not
being challenged, rather, it is being accepted for purposes of
argument because even if it is true, it does not, under Utah law,
invalidate the general release.
- 5-

to what was contemplated by the release, what consideration was
given."
The trial court's conclusion was a non sequiter.

It does not

logically follow that there was not a meeting of the minds at the
time the release was signed simply because Hartmark subsequently
raised a legal argument at trial in order to negate the relevance
of VPV's factual claims.

Hartmark argued at trial that even if

VPV's main motivation in signing the release was to obtain the
checkbook, such a motivation did not alter the fact that the
parties also gave mutual releases which, in and of themselves,
constituted adequate consideration.
In order for the trial court to have correctly held that there
was no meeting of the minds, it should have, but did not, base its
conclusion on the frame of mind of each party at the time they
entered into the agreement.3

The trial court's analysis is,

therefore, analytically flawed and should be corrected by this
court.
When one considers the frame of mind of each party based on
the trial court's underlying factual findings, i.e., that Hartmark
demanded the release in exchange for the records, that VPV entered
into the release in part to obtain the records, and that Hartmark
surrendered the records after obtaining the release, only one

3

. Hartmark was arguing that even if VPV's factual claims were
true regarding the records, they did not affect the validity of the
release because the mutual releases provided the necessary
consideration and nothing in VPV's factual claims negated that
mutual consideration.
- 6-

conclusion can be reached:

The parties were, in fact, in agreement

as to what was contemplated and what consideration was being given.
There is no dispute given the trial court's findings.

Both

parties expected, as part of entering into the Release Agreement,
the transfer of the records and the signing of the general release
by the other party.

Consequently, there is only one conclusion

which may be logically reached based upon the trial court's factual
findings:

There was, at the time the documents were signed, a

meeting of the minds.
Since there is only one logical conclusion, the trial court's
illogical conclusion should be corrected by this court. This court
should

reverse

the

trial

court's

ruling

that

the release was

invalid for a failure of a meeting of the minds.

To leave the

trial court's ruling in place would allow VPV to have the full
benefit

of

the bargain

it sought, while denying Hartmark

the

protection of the release for which he has paid the agreed upon
price.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE IS CONTRARY TO WELL-SETTLED
CASE LAW IN UTAH.
The

trial

court's

holding

that

there

was

inadequate

consideration for the general release is a legal evaluation of the
consideration given and is, therefore, subject to correction by
this court. The trial court erred in its legal conclusion that the
mutual releases were not adequate consideration to make the release
enforceable.

- 7 -

The only pertinent underlying facts are:

That both parties

signed a general release which mutually released the other from any
and all claims arising out of Hartmark's employment as an officer
of VPV; and that VPV's main motivation in signing the release was
to obtain the financial records.

Hartmark is not raising any

challenge to either of these facts. He is only raising a challenge
as to the trial court's legal conclusion as to the impact of the
second fact on the first fact.
Hartmark

claims that VPV's

"main motivation"

is legally

irrelevant to whether there was consideration given. Even if VPV's
main motivation was to obtain the records, it still received
Hartmark's binding promise to not bring any legal action against
VPV.

This is, under Utah law, all that is needed as consideration

for VPV's promise not to bring suit against Hartmark.

Allen v.

Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613, 237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951).
The trial court did not cite any legal precedent for its
ruling that an ulterior motive negates the express consideration
provided in the contract, nor has VPV provided any caselaw to
support the trial court.4

VPV appears to concede that the mutual

promises are adequate consideration, whatever the motivations may
have been.
Since, as a matter of law, there was adequate consideration
for VPV's release of all claims against Hartmark, regardless of any

Nor does the trial court justify its violation of the
parole evidence rule by looking to evidence outside the contract
itself to determine the consideration being given.
- 8-

ulterior

motive,

the

trial

court's

contrary

ruling

must

be

reversed.
Since there was a meeting of the minds as to what was
contemplated and what consideration was given, and since there was
adequate consideration given in the form of mutual promises, there
is no legal reason that the general release should not have been
enforced and VPV's claims dismissed.
III. APPELLEE CANNOT ASK THIS COURT TO MAKE A RULING BASED UPON
FACTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT NEVER FOUND.
Recognizing the flawed ruling below, VPV argues that this
court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the release was
invalid on grounds other than the grounds used by the trial court.
In particular, VPV argues that the release should be ruled invalid
under theories of duress, fraud, and wrongful concealment.
VPV is asking this court to make rulings the trial court never
made based upon facts the trial court never found.

Such a request

must be denied if the appropriate roles of the trial court and the
appellate court are to be preserved.
VPV misconstrues the doctrine that an appellate court may
"affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the
trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling."
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
This doctrine does not extend to allowing the appellate court to

- 9-

make factual findings on disputed facts which the trial court has
not made itself.5
The trial court clearly limited its ruling to the legal
theories that no contract was ever formed, i.e. failure of the
meeting of the minds and lack of adequate consideration. The trial
court hinted that it could have invalidated the release on a theory
of duress, but refused to do so.6

Further, it made no indication

that it would have even considered invalidating the release on a
theory that Hartmark had schemed to defraud VPV or had wrongfully
concealed facts from VPV.

For this court to make such rulings for

the first time on appeal would be a gross injustice to Hartmark.
In order for this doctrine to be applied in this case, this
court must first make basic factual findings which the trial court
did not make.

It is axiomatic that a trial court's ruling must be

supported by factual findings, particularly when the evidence is in
dispute.

Without such findings, a trial court's ruling must be

reversed. Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994) . In this
case, not only did the trial court not rule on these theories, it
did not make any factual findings that could support such rulings.

For example, the Supreme Court in Buehner affirmed the
trial court's ruling because this court viewed the trial court as
having erred in construing the parties' agreement, but concluded
that paragraph 9 of the Construction Commitment Letter did not
impose a duty on Home, and, therefore, the judgment in favor of
Home was affirmed.
6

. The trial court's hesitance was admittedly caused by the
inconsistency of such a ruling with existing Utah caselaw which
prevents VPV from claiming economic duress. This legal limitation
will be fully discussed in the next section.
- 10 -

All of VPV's theories

involved numerous disputed facts.

Without basic factual findings by the trial court concerning what
happened, including what was said, by whom, to whom, when, etc.,
there are no factual findings upon which this court could, for the
first time, find that Hartmark committed duress, schemed to defraud
VPV, or wrongfully concealed facts from VPV.
This is particularly true when one recognizes that a key fact
in each of VPV's theories is Hartmark's subjective intent.

This

court simply cannot make findings about Hartmark's subjective
intent from a cold record containing numerous factual disputes.
This court cannot determine which of the many versions of the facts
it should believe.

It has not observed the witnesses, heard the

explanations, nor weighed the conflicting testimony.7 Nor can this

VPV has not even gone to the trouble of identifying the
elements of its various theories and the pertinent evidence to show
that they were proven at trial. Apparently VPV not only wants this
court to do the work of the trial court, it also wants this court
to do VPV's work.
All VPV has done is set out miscellaneous
testimony in an attempt to show that Hartmark was a "bad person,"
and even that is inaccurately portrayed.
On page 14 of Appellee's brief Hartmark states "Hartmark
disappeared from the scene and took the checkbooks and financial
records with him." Trans. 117-21. The Brief also asserts that
Hartmark withheld the records from VPV until it signed a release.
There was never any direct evidence that Hartmark in fact had the
records or was refusing to surrender them without a release.
Hartmark's uncontradicted testimony was that he had left the
checkbook and records with various people at VPV, and VPV simply
could not find them because they were lost or misplaced. The only
evidence that Hartmark was withholding the checkbook until he
received a release were hearsay statements made by VPV's attorney
Ron Vance to that effect.
The conclusion that Hartmark had
actually taken the records was pure speculation on the part of the
officers of VPV. In fact, contrary to Appellee's assertion that
the checkbook "mysteriously appeared," the checkbook and records
were retrieved from VPV's attorney's office immediately after the
signing, not from Hartmark.
- 11 -

court imply such factual findings, when the trial court has not at
least made the ultimate conclusions sought by VPV.

State v.

Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994).
Furthermore, this court should not imply any factual findings
when Hartmark specifically objected to the trial court's lack of
adequate findings below, and VPV argued below that the findings
were sufficient.

VPV must be deemed to have waived any argument

that factual findings should now be implied, since it has expressly
argued that the findings were adequate.8

The representation that the terms of the release were not
negotiated is patently false since the release was in fact drafted
by VPV's attorney. Inasmuch as VPV's attorney was acting as VPV's
agent, it is impossible to say that the terms of the release were
not bargained for nor negotiated. At best, VPV may have a claim
against its attorney for doing a poor job, but it cannot claim that
the job was never done.
Finally, VPV claims, on page 14 of its brief, that the only
consideration given for the release was the return of the records
which belonged to VPV. Not only is this a legal conclusion instead
of a fact, it is erroneous. The mutual releases were also given as
consideration.
Even if all of these facts were accepted as true, which they
should not be since they were contested and no findings were made
by the trial court, they do not require a finding of a scheme to
defraud, or wrongful concealment, or duress. Even if Hartmark kept
the records until he obtained a release and resigned, such action
would be prudent by a financial officer. Hartmark had every right
to retain those records until he resigned since he was still the
financial officer of VPV. His reluctance to surrender the records
before he resigned does not prove ill intent. These "facts" simply
do not justify this court invalidating the release on such grounds
on its own initiative.
8

. It would be extremely poor precedent to allow a party to
claim at trial that the findings are adequate and then allow the
party to ask the Appellate Court to fill in the blanks. VPV's
approach amounts to invited error which has consistently been ruled
to be a waiver of any defect. State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah
1992) . VPV should therefore be bound to only those findings and
conclusions expressly made by the trial court.
- 12 -

Inasmuch

as

the

trial

court

did

not

find

that

Hartmark

obtained the release under duress, as part of a scheme to defraud,
or following wrongful concealment, the trial court did not even
make basic factual findings to support such conclusions.

This

court should not assume the role of the trial court by making such
factual findings and rulings now for the first time on appeal.
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987).
IV.

ECONOMIC DURESS IS NOT A VALID DEFENSE TO A RELEASE OF CLAIMS.
Even if the trial court had expressly ruled that the release

was invalid because of economic duress, such a ruling should be
reversed by this court for being contrary to established caselaw.
Utah does not recognize economic duress as a defense to a release
of claims.
VPV has been less than candid with this court on this point.
VPV quotes Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 754
(Utah

1982),

for

the proposition

that

!I

[t]o constitute

legal

duress, defendant must have acted against his will, and had no
other viable alternative."

What VPV fails to tell this court is

that the Supreme Court in Horgan expressly held that economic
duress is not a legal defense to a release of claims in Utah.
Supreme Court stated:
. Nor is plaintiff's claimed financial need an
adequate defense to the release. 'The mere fact that a
contract is entered into under stress or pecuniary
necessity is insufficient [to constitute duress]' . . .
Many releases are negotiated and signed out of economic
necessity: to adopt plaintiff's argument would therefore
invite the avoidance of many good faith settlements.
Horgan, at 754.

- 13 -

The

Consequently, even if the trial court had expressly "found"
that the release was entered into under duress, such duress would
have been purely economic and, therefore, inconsequential as a
matter of law. Even if the efforts by Hartmark to protect himself
were deemed "duress," as claimed by VPV, since the duress would
only be economic, the release would not be rendered unenforceable.
Even if this court were willing to overturn the Supreme Court
and allow economic duress to invalidate a release, this would not
be the appropriate case. As the Supreme Court noted in its general
discussion

of

alternative."

duress,

a

party

Horcran, at 754.

simple alternative.

must

have

"no

other

viable

VPV, in this case, had a very

It had approximately 10 days, during which

time it could have asked a court to order Hartmark to turn over the
checkbook, or to order the bank to allow an officer of VPV access
to VPV's account so as to order stop-payments on all outstanding
checks and to make the necessary payments to keep its doors opens.
The facts of this case are quite similar to the facts of
Horgan.

The plaintiff had entered into a general release, and

then, some time later, decided to bring an action in spite of the
release.

As the Supreme Court noted:

"The mere fact of an

improvident or bad bargain or a feeling of latent discontent is not
a sufficient basis to avoid the effect of an otherwise valid
release."

Horgan, at 754.

In this case, VPV willingly entered

into a release because they thought it was the best method to
resolve the disputes existing between the parties.

Once they got

what they wanted, they regretted the business decision they made,
- 14 -

and now seek to renege on their agreement.

This court is not here

to give VPV relief from the benefit of its own bargain. Id.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING THAT HARTMARK
BENEFITTED FROM A CHECK MADE PAYABLE TO SIG SCHREYER FROM VPV.
When the trial court ruled that Hartmark had breached his

fiduciary duty by writing a check from VPV to Sig Schreyer, the
trial court failed to make any factual finding that Hartmark had
personally benefitted from such a check. Without a factual finding
that

Hartmark

conclusion

benefitted

that

Hartmark

from

the

breached

check,
his

the

trial

fiduciary

supported by the findings and must be reversed.

duty

court's
is

not

State v. Lovegren,

798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990). 9
It

appears

that

VPV

is

requesting

that

this

court

retroactively imply a factual finding of personal benefit.

As

indicated previously, it would be improper to imply any factual
findings in this case, especially when VPV affirmatively argued
below that the findings were adequate.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the trial

court's

ruling that it recognized the necessity of finding a personal
benefit before finding a breach of fiduciary duty.

In fact, the

trial

unauthorized

court

merely

held

that

the

9

check

was

"an

. This discussion is not needed if this court determines that
the settlement between VPV and Schreyer constitutes an accord and
satisfaction of the claim for recovery of the $10,370. Since VPV
accepted $4,000 from Schreyer who actually received the money at
issue, the debt should be deemed satisfied in full and any
secondary liability of Hartmark forgiven. It appears that since
VPV did not even raise an argument on this point in its brief that
it has conceded the point.
The judgment as it relates to the
Schreyer check should therefore be reversed.
- 15 -

transfer of funds."

Court's ruling, 6.

Simply finding that

Hartmark made an unauthorized transfer is not a finding that he did
so for personal gain, or that to do so was a breach of a fiduciary
duty.

At best, it shows that the trial court believed Hartmark

made a transfer that he should not have made.
To hold, as the trial

court did, that an unauthorized

transfer, in and of itself, is a breach of a fiduciary duty, would
be to adopt a rule of law so broad that it would cover every good
faith mistaken payment.

It is clear that some personal gain must

be proven before an "unauthorized transfer" will amount to a breach
of fiduciary duty.

Mere error in judgment is not enough.

In seeking to imply a factual finding of personal benefit, VPV
claims that the evidence supporting the court's "factual finding"10
is overwhelming.

VPV then recites a litany of irrelevant facts

which do not prove that Hartmark breached his fiduciary duty by
personally benefitting from the check to Schreyer.

The only

possibly relevant "evidence" is an affidavit from Schreyer, who
could not appear because of illness, wherein Schreyer states that
Hartmark had personally guaranteed repayment of the loan from
Schreyer to Echochem. In violation of the "best evidence" rule, no
copy of any such personal guaranty was ever presented by VPV.
10

In

.
Once again, VPV mischaracterizes the trial court's
ultimate conclusion as a factual finding.
Whether Hartmark
breached his fiduciary duty is a legal conclusion made based upon
the underlying facts. Hartmark is claiming that the trial court
erred in making that conclusion without first finding that Hartmark
received a personal benefit from the check. This is not a factual
error but a legal error in concluding that a breach of fiduciary
duty does not require personal benefit. Consequently, a correction
of error standard of review applies.
- 16 -

fact, the note from VPV to Echochem, which was admitted into
evidence, clearly indicated that Hartmark signed as an officer of
Echochem and not individually.

P. Ex. 2.

In contradiction to VPV's assertion of misconduct was the
uncontroverted testimony from Hartmark, Gardner

(a director of

VPV) , and Vance (VPV's legal counsel) that Hartmark met with Vance
and sought his legal advice before issuing the check, and that
Vance authorized the payment since VPV owed money to Echochem.
Vance himself indicated that there was nothing illegal about the
payment, only that it was sloppy accounting procedure.
Given VPV's waiver of any need for an implied factual finding,
and the lack of any indication in the trial court's ruling that it
found Hartmark had benefitted personally, the absence of any
reliable admissible evidence that Hartmark benefitted personally
from the check, and the clear, uncontroverted evidence that the
payment was made with the knowledge and consent of VPV's legal
counsel, this court should not imply a finding that Hartmark
personally benefitted from the check to Schreyer.
Consequently, the court's ruling that Hartmark breached his
fiduciary duty must be reversed for lack of adequate findings.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE $10,000 CHECK ISSUED
TO HARTMARK#S ACCOUNT WAS NOT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES.
The trial court refused to accept Hartmark's claim that the

$10,000

check

issued

to

his

California

account

was

for

reimbursement of his expenses and compensation for 19 88 when
setting up VPV.

The court stated that there was "no competent

evidence" as to the nature of the expenses.
- 17 -

If the trial court

made

its ruling after

concluding

that

there was no

competent

evidence as to the nature of expenses, the trial court's ruling is
inaccurate and, therefore, erroneous on its face.
Hartmark is not challenging a factual finding that Hartmark
was

not

entitled

to

the

1988

compensation

and

because no such factual finding was ever made.

reimbursement,

Rather, the trial

court erroneously stated that since there was no competent evidence
as to the nature of the expenses, such expenses must not have been
for reimbursement of expenses.

Such an error in analysis may be

freely corrected by this court.
To the extent the trial court may have intended to say that
the evidence was insufficient to persuade the court because it did
not show the nature of all of the 1988 expenses, Hartmark did not
need to prove every expense so as to total $10,000.

Hartmark only

needed to prove the total sum.
The amount owed from VPV to Hartmark had already been agreed
upon

by

the

officers

of

Hartmark7 s

VPV.

claims

for

1988

reimbursement and compensation had already been presented to VPV,
and an accord and satisfaction had been reached regarding those
claims.

That

accord

and

satisfaction

was

evidenced

by

the

memorandum setting forth the amounts each officer was to receive.
D. Ex. 22.
Once the accord and satisfaction was reached, all Hartmark
needed

to prove

memorandum.

was

the

agreed

upon

amount

recorded

on

the

Since the memorandum was admitted into evidence, the

trial court had sufficient competent evidence to prove that the
- 18 -

amount claimed was, in fact, owed to Hartmark.

To hold that

Hartmark needed to prove the nature of each expense before he could
claim them violated the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, which
was a legal error.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF FAIR MARKET VALUE ON
THE PORTABLE TELEPHONE.
Whether the trial court applied the appropriate measure of
damages for conversion of the portable telephone is a legal
question

of

the proper

formula

for damages.

The

case law

unequivocally states that the appropriate formula, as a matter of
law, is the fair market value at the time of the conversion.

If

the trial court used a different method of calculating damages, it
has made a legal error which this court may correct.
Hartmark is not claiming that the trial court erred in finding
a fair market value of $1,000. That would be a factual challenge.
Hartmark is claiming that the trial court erred in not finding the
fair market value at all. Martell testified that VPV purchased the
telephone for $1,000, but there was no evidence as to what the
telephone was worth at the time of the conversion. The trial court
awarded the purchase price, less the value of the phone at the time
of trial, contrary to the law.
Since VPV did not provide any evidence as to the fair market
value at the time of the conversion, any attempt to set a fair
market value would be pure speculation, which is not allowed.
Henderson v. For-Shor Company, 757 P.2d 485

(Utah App. 1988) .

Since VPV had the burden of proving fair market value, and it
failed to do so, it failed to prove its damages and, therefore, is
- 19 -

not entitled to damages or a reduction.

Connell v. Tooele City,

572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).
VIII. WITHOUT A FINDING THAT A MOTION WAS FRIVOLOUSLY MADE,
ATTORNEY'S FEES CANNOT BE AWARDED.
In order for the trial court to lawfully award attorney's fees
for a frivolous motion, it must first find that the motion was made
without merit.

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987).

Judge Daniels never made such a finding, nor did Judge Iwasaki.
Without such a preliminary finding, the trial court could not find
that VPV was entitled to attorneys fees.

Without a finding of

entitlement to fees, any award of fees is erroneous as a matter of
law.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) .
Once again, VPV is seeking an implied finding that the motion

was frivolous.

As argued before, VPV should not be allowed to

salvage the faulty judgment by seeking implied findings, since VPV
argued below that the findings were adequate.

Furthermore, there

is not a sufficient manifestation that either Judge Daniels or
Judge Iwasaki ever actually found that the motion was frivolous.
The comment by Judge Daniels that the "request for attorney's
fees will be taken under advisement and handled at a later time,
depending on the merits of the underlying claim as to whether the
corporation was properly authorized to file this suit," shows only
that he had not made the requisite finding of frivolity at that
time, and would not do so unless Hartmark's claim failed on the
merits.
VPV

erroneously

subsequently

failed

claims

that

since

on the merits, that
- 20 -

Hartmark's

motion

it is automatically

entitled to attorney's fees under Judge Daniels' statement.

The

failure of Hartmark's motion, however, was merely a precondition,
not the determining factor.

Unless the motion failed on the

merits, there obviously could not be any cLaim for attorney's fees.
But mere failure of Hartmark's motion is not enough to show that
Judge Daniels actually found the motion frivolous, because it does
not logically follow that because Hartmark's motion failed, that it
was frivolous. O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 309. Since the motion was not
decided on the merits until after Judge Daniels had retired, there
is no logical way that a finding of frivolity can be implied to
him.
Judge Iwasaki gave no indication that he personally had
evaluated the motion and determined that it was frivolous.

In

fact, given VPV's representation to Judge Iwasaki that Judge
Daniels had already determined that attorney's fees would be
awarded if the motion was unsuccessful, it is unlikely that Judge
Iwasaki ever gave the matter any independent thought.

There is

certainly no indication in the record that Judge Iwasaki personally
found the motion to be frivolous.
Since there is no reliable indication that the trial court
actually made the requisite finding that the motion was frivolous,
no such finding should be implied.

Since there is no finding of

entitlement necessary to support an award of attorney's fees, the
award should be vacated.

Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 989.
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IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS TO VPV.
If the trial court awarded costs which are not allowed by law,

this would clearly be a legal error which may be corrected by this
court. The standard for awarding deposition costs is fairly clear
and straight forward.

The deposition must be "essential to the

development and presentation of the case."
P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) .

Morgan v. Morgan, 795

This means that the case must be so

complex that discovery cannot be completed through less expensive
means. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d
507, 512 (Utah App. 1988) .
VPV's only justification of the depositions was that they were
necessary to "lock in" the testimony of the main players. VPV does
not explain why it needed depositions to "lock in" the testimony of
its own witnesses, Martell and Owens.

It seems that taking the

deposition of one's own witnesses is really not essential to
complete discovery.

Therefore, at least the costs of the Martell

and Owens depositions should have been denied.
Even assuming that "locking in" testimony is a valid goal of
discovery, VPV presents absolutely no explanation why requests for
admissions or interrogatories would not have adequately "locked in"
the testimonies of Hartmark and Gardner.

The simple fact of the

matter is that VPV wants to shift the hard costs of bringing its
own lawsuit onto Hartmark.

If the tests set out in Morgan and

Lloyd' s are to have any meaning, then the award of deposition costs
must be reversed.
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X.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT ITS
RULINGS.
Hartmark is not claiming that the trial court erred by not

making written findings, although they certainly would have been
helpful.

Hartmark is claiming that the oral findings made by the

trial court are inadequate to support the rulings

made.

As is evident from the many questions raised by Hartmark, the
trial court did not provide detailed findings in order to set forth
the steps of the court's analysis.

Adams v. Bd. of Review of the

Industrial Comm. , 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) . If it had, many of
the issues raised on appeal would not have been raised.
Inasmuch as Hartmark protested the inadequacy of the findings
below, and VPV stridently argued that they were sufficient, any
deficiency in the findings should now be resolved in favor of
Hartmark.

Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988) .

No findings should be implied by this court in order to uphold
any of the trial court's rulings in favor of VPV.

To do so would

allow VPV, who drafted the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law, to invite error by omitting detailed findings,
and then benefit from that error on appeal by claiming that the
omitted finding was favorable to its position. Hartmark should not
now be penalized for doing all that he could to correct the
inadequacy of the trial court's findings in a timely manner.
If the trial court had actually made the requisite subsidiary
findings regarding the basic facts which are missing in this case,
it may have realized that its initial rulings were wrong.
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See Adams v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Comm. , 821 P.2d 1,
(Utah App. 1991) .
XI.

HARTMARK'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS BASED UPON PRESERVING
THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
VPV

misconstrues

Hartmark's

request

for

attorney's

fees.

Hartmark is simply preserving his claim to attorney's fees in the
event he prevails on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court misconstrued and misapplied the law to the
facts of this case when it ruled that the general release was
invalid.

The entire judgment should, therefore, be reversed, and

the matter

returned

to

the

trial

court

for

attorney's fees, both below and on appeal.

consideration

of

In the alternative,

each award should be reversed for the respective reasons set forth
herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^

day of June, 1995.

SMITH & HANNA

P. Kevin Bond
Perri Ann Babalis
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